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Summary  findings
Industrial  plants face pressure  to abate water pollution  They find that high levels  of pollution  in India  elicit a
from many sources,  national and local,  through formal  formal  regulatory  response:  inspections.  But inspections
government  regulation  and through more informal  are ineffective  in bringing  about changes  in behavior,
pressure  from consumer  groups and concern  for the  probably  because  of bureaucratic  or other problems  in
firm's reputation.  follow-through.  Moreover,  poorly  paid inspectors  with
Formal  regulation  tends to reflect  the bargaining  low  morale  may be susceptible  to "rent-seeking."
power of local communities  and is not as uniform or  They find little evidence  to support the hypothesis  that
blind  as the law would  imply.  Regulators  are not immune  better-educated  and higher-income  communities  are
to the pulls and pushes  of powerful  community  interests.  better able to pressure  plants to reduce  emissions  than
Studies  of enforcement  in the U.S.  steel industry,  for  are poorer communities,  although  there are significantly
example,  find that it is weaker at plants that are major  more  inspections  in more developed  districts.  In India,
employers  in the local labor  market.  whatever  community  pressure  exists  is probably
Using  survey  data from India, Pargal,  Mani, and Huq  channeled  through formal regulatory  mechanisms.
examine  whether the monitoring  and enforcement  Larger plants in India, as in the rest of the world, tend
efforts  of provincial  pollution  control authorities  are  to be "cleaner"  than smaller  plants. Indian policymakers
affected  by local community  characteristics  (which  serve  and regulators  may want to explicitly  recognize  the
as proxies  for political  power).  They also  test for  tradeoff in environmental  quality  of the existing
evidence  that informal  pressure  on plants results  in  regulatory  bias  toward the small-  and medium-scale
negotiated  reductions  in emissions.  sector.
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Industrial  plants face pressure  to abate pollution  from many sources,  working  through  different  channels.
On the one hand there is regulation  by local or central  pollution  control authorities,  who can formally
impose  fines, closures or other  types of punishment  for violating  regulatory  provisions. On the other
hand are communities,  which seek compliance  with locally  acceptable  norms  or standards.
Many cases of direct negotiation  and "Coasian"  bargaining  between  plant managements  and local
inhabitants  have been documented  around  the world.  These  informal  arrangements  may rely upon
reputational  concelns, direct threats  or social  pressure. Of course,  reputational  and other  concerns  can
play out through  the market as well, e.g., through  consumer  pressure  in export  and domestic  markets, or
through  the impact  on stock prices,  bank lending  rates, etc. 2 This impact  has sometimes  been explicitly
leveraged  by regulators  via public information  campaigns  and various  types of "Green" labeling
schemes. 3
At the same  time, it is recognized  that formal  regulation,  especially  the monitoring  and enforcement  of
standards,  tends to reflect the bargaining  power  of local communities  and is not quite as uniform  or blind
as the law would imply. Regulators  are not immune  to the pulls and pushes  of powerful  interests  at the
community  level. Especially  in a democratic  polity,  local political power  cannot  be ignored  when
deciding  where to target limited  resources. Gray and Deily  (1996) show that enforcement  in the US steel
industry  is lower at plants which are large  employers  in the local labor  market. Dion et al. (1997) find
considerable  local variation in the stringency  of monitoring  of compliance  with uniform  national
standards  in the pulp and paper  sector  in Quebec. There may be no objection  on economic  efficiency
grounds  if regulators  end up focusing  on areas where activism,  political  power, or incomes  are high,
since  these would be the very areas  which  would have a higher valuation  of environmental  damages.
While  such outcomes  tend to offend  the sense  of equity that is implicit in uniform  national  regulation,
they are problematic  only if they result in a diversion  of resources  from "objectively"  serious
I  For  instances  see Pargal  and  Wheeler  (1996),  Hettige,  Huq,  Pargal  and  Wheeler  (1996).
2  See  Hamilton  (1993),  Arora  and  Cason  (1996).
3  For  example:  the  TRI  in the  USA,  PROPER  in Indonesia.
2environmental  problems  to more frivolous  issues. 4 As is well known,  it is entirely  possible  that the
regulatory  process  might be "captured"  by particular  interest  groups  (Stigler 1971,  Peltzman  1976).
Firms factor in local activism  as well as the strength  of likely  regulatory  pressures  when making location,
production,  or pollution  abatement  decisions. For instance,  studies  on the exposure  of different
population  subgroups  to environmental  pollution 5 have noted  that hazardous  waste generators  in the US
tend to be disproportionately  located  in disadvantaged  areas,  leading  to questions  of regulatory
discrimination  on income  or racial grounds.6  While  discrimination  has not been conclusively
demonstrated  by any study, Hamilton  (1993) has shown  that commercial  hazardous  waste generating
firms do take explicit  account of the ability  of a community  to organize politically,  as proxied  by voter
turnout  rates, when making  capacity  expansion  decisions.  Informal  arrangements  between  plants and
communities  are, thus, likely to be complementary  to existing  formal regulation,  and usually  exist
alongside  the latter.
In this paper we use survey data from India  to examine  whether  the monitoring  and enforcement  efforts
of provincial  pollution  control  authorities  are affected  by local community  characteristics  that act as
proxies  for political  power. At the same  time we test for evidence  of informal  pressure  on plants  that
would  result in negotiated  lower emissions.
We follow the basic approach  taken by Pargal  and Wheeler  (1996) in modeling  pollution  emissions  as
the equilibrium  outcome  of a demand  for emissions  or "use of environmental  services"  originating  from
industrial  plants,  and a supply  of environmental  services  being provided  by communities. The supply
price of pollution  is determined  by the community's  valuation  of the damage caused  by pollution  and by
its ability  to extract  recompense  from the polluting  plants, i.e., its bargaining  power. We think  that the
negotiating  strength  of communities  is likely  to be highly  correlated  with income  level, and correlates  of
income  like literacy. In the absence  of district  level data on income,  we have used  an indicator  of district
development  which incorporates  literacy,  urbanization,  and other factors to proxy for negotiating  power.
4  See  for instance  Dasgupta  and  Wheeler  (1997).
5  See  Gould  (1986),  Greenberg  and  Anderson  (1984),  Brooks  and  Sethi  (1997).
6  Been  (1994)  has shown  that  race  and  poverty  may  be important  factors  in siting  decisions  for  landfills  and
other  undesirable  entities.  She  also  shows  that  the  impact  of such  entities  on disadvantaged  communities  is
often  exacerbated  by the  functioning  of  property  markets.
3The demand  for environmental  services  from plants is a derived  demand  akin to other factor demands.
Demand  shift factors  include plant characteristics,  external  pressure  to abate and the prices  of other
inputs  - all of which  would affect the marginal  cost of abatement.
This paper is organized  as follows. Section  II presents  an overview  of the state of environmental
regulation  in India. We present  our model and econometric  estimation  framework  in section III and
describe  the data in section  IV. Estimation  results are presented  in section  V, with section VI
concluding.
H.  Environmental regulation in India
There is a basic division  of power  between  the centre  and the states in India, reflecting  the federal nature
of the Indian  Constitution. The  mandate  of the Central  Pollution  Control  Board (CPCB)  is to set
environmental  standards  for all plants in India,  lay down ambient  standards,  and coordinate  the activities
of the State  Pollution  Control  Boards (SPCBs). The implementation  of environmental  laws and their
enforcement,  however,  are decentralized,  and are the responsibility  of the SPCBs. Anecdotal  evidence
suggests  wide variations  in enforcement  across the states. In fact it has been argued  (Gupta 1996)  that
although  states  cannot  compete  by lowering  environmental  standards  in order to attract new investment,
they can get around  this by lax enforcement.
The two main pollution  control statutes in India  are the Water (Prevention  and Control  of Pollution)  Act
of 1974,  and the Air (Prevention  and Control  of Pollution)  Act which came into  being in 1981.
Thereafter,  Parliament  passed  the Environment  (Protection)  Act in 1986. This was designed  to act as
umbrella  legislation  for the environment,  with responsibility  for administering  the new legislation  falling
on the Central  and State Boards. The law prohibits  the pollution  of water  bodies and requires  that
generators  of effluent/  discharges  get the prior consent  of the SPCBs. This consent  to operate  must be
renewed  periodically.
SPCBs  have  the legal authority  to conduct  periodic inspections  of plants  to check  whether  they have  the
appropriate  consent  to operate, whether  they have  effluent  treatment  plants,  take samples  for analysis,
4etc.7 Some of these inspections are also programmed in response to public requests and litigation.  The
penalty for non-compliance is fines and imprisonment, but until 1988 the enforcement authority of the
SPCBs was very weak.  It was limited to criminal prosecution (with its attendant delays) and seeking
injunctions to restrain polluters.  Now, however, SPCBs have the power to close non-compliant factories
or cut-off their water and electricity by administrative orders.  The potential cost to the plants of non-
compliance is thus not trivial, so there should be an incentive for plants to comply with the law.
However, compliance depends on both  monitoring and enforcement of the law by the SPCBs.
Since water pollution regulations have been on the books longest, and there are well known and
relatively inexpensive means of testing these emissions, we decided to focus on water pollution
monitoring in this paper.  Also, we examine the impact of inspections on water pollution emissions to
assess just how successful the laws are in their implementation.  It is often the case that organizations
measure "success"  in achieving their policy goals in terms of an increase in spending or the number of
actions taken, rather than outcomes.  For instance, assessing performance by counting the frequency or
absolute number of inspections rather than the resulting environmental quality would be valid if, indeed,
inspections have an impact on emissions.  In the Indian context, despite a strong legal framework and the
existence of a large bureaucracy for dealing with environmental regulation, the public perception is that
implementation remains weak.
Given the penalties in force for non-compliance in India and keeping in mind the extent of the SPCBs'
powers, it should be emphasized that the impact of inspections on compliance will be only as strong as
the threat of enforcement and punishment faced by the plant.  In an environment of corrupt local
inspectors or bureaucratic procedures that hamstring action against errant behavior, inspections alone are
unlikely to be effective.  Also, the reality is that resource constraints at the state level mean that
environmental management often degenerates into crisis management. 8 Inspections are undertaken at the
time that operating consent is granted, and thereafter usually only in response to complaints, accidents or
other emergencies.
7  "...to inspect  sewage  or trade  effluents,  works and plants  for the treatmnent  of sewage  and trade effluents...  or in
connection  with  the grant of any consent  as required  by this Act." Water  (Prevention  and Control  of Pollution)
Act, 1974.
s  Conversation  with Utpal Mukhopadhaya,  former  Environment  Secretary  in Maharashtra,  India.
5In our sample of 250 plants, 51 plants indicated that they had undertaken abatement in response to NGO
pressure and 102 said they had done so in response to complaints from neighbouring communities.  This
led us to conjecture that there would be a limited plant level response to inspections alone.
m.  Model and  estimation
We assume a competitive industrial structure where firms take output and factor prices as given.
Pollution emissions are modeled as another factor of production in an extended KLEM framework.
Firms face a pote,ntial penalty for polluting which is a function of regulatory and community pressure.
This penalty is increasing in emissions levels, Z; in the intensity of the  direct regulatory monitoring and
enforcement effort, 1i;  and in community bargaining power, which is proxied by the level of
development, d, of the district in which the plant is located.  The expression +(Z,d,g), where fz>O,  Pg0,
Od >O, is a reduced form representation of the total pollution penalty faced by the plant. Thus each firm
minimizes costs as described below:
Min  PL*L+ PK.K+PM*M+PE*E+(Z,d,4l),  s.t. y <f(L,K,E,M,Z;  0)
L,K,E,M,Z
where y is output, L, K, E and M refer to labor, capital, energy, and materials respectively.  0 captures
exogenous shift factors.  From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for cost minimization we obtain the usual
marginal conditions as well as the following implicit equation for optimal emissions at an interior
optimum:  Xfx - Px  = 0, for X=L, K, E, M and Xfz  - 1z(Z,d,  .t) = 0, where X is the Lagrange
multiplier.
Solving this system of equations, we get a reduced form expression for equilibrium emissions.  At a
given level of output, y, emissions are Z  =  (y, PL  . PK  I PE  ,pM; 0, X,  li, d) . Reflecting the fact that
regulatory effort is not uniform but varies in accordance with different priorities, including the perceived
magnitude of environmental damage, degree of political power etc., inspections or monitoring, pt, are
modeled separately as lt = y (Z,d;8)  with 8 being a set of shift factors.
Thus we model emissions as a function of factor prices, scale of operation, indicators of informal
pressure, regulatory pressure as measured by inspections, and shift factors (plant age, firm characteristics
like whether they export or not, and whether or not they are publicly traded, and sector).  Plant
inspections, in turn, are modeled as dependent upon expected emissions levels, the use to which the
6water in the effluent stream is put, plant age and size, state per capita GDP and extent of manufacturing
activity as measured by the number of plants, and the district's  level of development.  The latter is our
proxy for envirommental  awareness and activism in the plant's vicinity that might lead to increased
inspections - in response to complaints or other types of citizen action.9 Although inspections are
expected to be a function of expected  emissions levels, since past pollution levels predict current
emission levels very well (Magat and Viscusi 1990), we have used current emission levels to proxy for
expected emissions in the inspection equation.
Our empirical specification is as follows.
(1)  BOD emissions:
Z = 1o  +P1I  Size + P3  PL  + P3  PE  + P4  PK  + 15J + P6age + P3exporter +f38employment  share + P1sector + u
(2)  Inspections:
L  = aO+al Z+a2 state manuf. + a3 per capita gdp+ a4 district development+ a5 age + a6 size +
a7recipient water body used for bathing + a8 recipient water body used by downstream industry +co
Here, u and 0) are error termns,  assumed to be iid normal and uncorrelated across the equations.  Given
the possible endogeneity of inspections and emissions, OLS is expected to lead to biased results.  We
have hence used two-stage least squares (2SLS) for our analysis.
We are agnostic about the coefficient signs on factor prices, since they are inputs into both the
production of the final output, and emissions abatement, and can therefore have opposing effects.
Organic water pollution is usually due to greater materials intensity, so to the extent that different factors
are substitutes or complements of materials in production we would get appropriate coefficient signs.
We suspect that labor is a large component of abatement in the Indian context and so wages would be
expected to have a positive coefficient.  But, to the extent that labor and materials are complements in
production, a move away from materials intensive methods would lead to a decline in organic water
pollution, leading to a negative relationship.  Our initial hypothesis is that the production effect is likely
Recent  work (e.g. Hettige  et al (1996))  has analyzed  the role of community  action  in directly  pressuring
polluters  in several countries  of South  and South-East  Asia, and we conjecture  that literacy,  urbanization,  and
income  levels  may be valid indicators  of the same  phenomenon  in our sample. These variables  are subsumed
in the district  development  index used in our analysis.
7to outweigh  the abatement  effect.'0 Abatement  requires  both capital and energy so price increases  for
these factors  would be expected  to lead  to a decline  in abatement  and a consequent  increase  in emissions.
If the relationship  between  materials  and energy  or capital is one of gross substitutability,  this would also
lead to a move  towards more materials  intensive  production,  which would reinforce  the positive  impact
on emissions.II
Our prior hypothesis  was that large plants  are likely  to be less pollution intensive  than small primarily
because  of scale economies  in abatement,  but also since smaller  plants  might lack technical information
and access  to financial  resources,  especially  if capital  markets  are imperfect.12  It appears likely  that
more concentrated  industries  would be more  resistant  to regulation,  but since we lack data on the market
concentration  rates in these sectors we cannot  include  a measure  of market power in our regressions.
Recent  work using  US data has found that multi-plant  firms are more likely to be compliant  than single
plant firms, partly because  there may be spillovers  of a non-compliant  reputation  across plants  belonging
to the same  firms leading  to more stringent  enforcement  of regulations  (Gray and Deily 1996). Thus we
expected  multi-plant  firms to be more likely  to have lower  emissions than single  plant firms, ceteris
paribus. As mentioned  earlier,  we expected  sensitivity  to environmental  news, and hence greater
compliance  and lower overall emissions  on the part of traded firms than non-traded. Finally,  based on
anecdotal  evidence,  we expected  plants with a greater exposure  to foreign  ideas  and influence,  like
exporters,  to be more likely  to be in compliance  than  domestically  owned  plants.
XV.  Data
As described above, the source for all the plant-level data was a survey of industrial plants in 8 states of
India conducted in early 1996. Its coverage was fairly good both in terms of sector and state-wise
distribution.  Leaving out the plants in the cement sector, Table I lists the distribution of plants by state
and Table 2 the distribution of plants by sector.  In addition, we used district and state level data on
'°  The argument  on production  is more compelling  for materials  prices - which  we do not have. Instead,  we have
used sectoral  dummies  to capture  the very different  materials  intensity  of production  in different  sectors.
"  For a discussion  of these issues  in greater  detail see Pargal  and Wheeler  (1996).
12  The survey  does not cover the huge informal  small  scale  sector in India  since  those plants rarely  have  the
means  to test effluent or install  pollution  control equipment,  and therefore  do not have an accurate  idea of their
emissions  levels  or compliance  status.
8prices and socio-economic characteristics.  Data sources are listed in  Appendix Table IA, and summary
statistics on the variables used in our regressions appear in Appendix Table 2A.
Table 1.
State  Number of Plants





Tamil Nadu  36
Uttar Pradesh  58
West Bengal  20
Total  250
Table  2.
Sectors  Number of Plants
Leather  40
Oil and Petrochemicals  22
Paper  68
Iron and Steel  55
Synthetic Fibre  11
Textiles  54
Total  250
The two main plant level variables used in the study are emissions and inspections.  We have focused on
Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD), the most commonly used measure of organic water pollution in both
industrial and developing countries.13 It is usually measured by the amount (kg) of oxygen used over
five days to completely oxidize the organic pollutants in the effluent.  The monthly average 5-day BOD
measure generated by each plant is used in the analysis.  Our inspection measure is the total number of
inspections that each plant has been subject to between 1990 and 1994.  Table 3 provides the mean
number of such inspections per plant in our sample in each state, along with the total number of large and
medium plants in the state.
13  BOD measures  the oxygen  used during  the breakdown  of organic  pollutants  by naturally-occuning  micro-
organisms. This  process  removes  dissolved  oxygen  from the water and can seriously  damage  some fish
species  as well as accelerate  the growth  of undesirable  algae.
9We have  used the number  of years the plant has been in operation  to measure  the age of the plant. The
export  variable is a dummy  indicating  whether  the plant is an exporter  or not.
Table  3.
State  Average  number  of inspections  Total number  of
per plant between 1990  and 1994  plants in the state
Andhra  Pradesh  44  15972
Delhi  11  3346
Gujarat  27  1104
Karnataka  15  5850
Maharashtra  36  15264
Tamil  Nadu  43  15502
Uttar  Pradesh  15  10124
West  Bengal  10  5679
Since  data on per capita income  or consumption  at the district level was not available,  we have used
instead  an index  of district development  which was created  by the Centre for Monitoring  the Indian
Economy  (CMIE). This is a weighted  average  of the value of sectoral  output,  the level of bank credit to
each primary  sector, labor force  participation  rates, savings  rates, literacy  and urbanization.' 4 We expect
it to be highly  correlated  with income.
We use per capita state domestic  product  to measure  the overall level of development  of the state, which
is a proxy for state-level  interest in environmental  regulation. We expect more  developed  states  to focus
more  on environmental  regulation. The  number  of large and medium  manufacturing  facilities that are
subject  to regulation  is used  to indicate  the size of the regulated  manufacturing  sector  in the state. In the
absence  of relevant  district level data on labor  and energy  prices, we have used the state level
manufacturing  wage and electricity  tariff for industry. Given the substantial  heterogeneity  that exists
across states  (and homogeneity  within  states) in factor  prices, our variables  appear  to be good proxies.
The rate of interest is the state-wide  average  rate at which the firms can borrow.
14  The  population  density  of the  district  as well  as the  population  in the  surrounding  community  were  considered
as other  possible  proxies,  but  not  used  due  to their  high  collinearity  with  the  development  index.
10V.  Estimation  results
We feel strongly that the inspection and emissions equations are not independent.  We expect high
emissions levels to trigger inspections and a significant impact of inspections on emissions.  Also, many
of the same variables are expected to determine inspections as emissions.  We have hence used two stage
least squares methods to estimate both equations.  We report both 2SLS and OLS estimation results in
Tables 4 and 5 below.  From the similarity of coefficient estimates under both OLS and 2SLS for the
BOD equation, it appears that inspections are truly exogenous as determinants of BOD emissions levels.
On the other hand, this is not the case for the inspections equation. 5  First stage regression results are
reported in the Appendix (Tables 3A and 4A).
Table  4.  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  LOG NUMBER  OF INSPECTIONS
Independent Variables  OLS  2SLS
(in logs)
Coeff.  T-stat.  Coeff.  T-stat.
BOD load  0.120  1.918*  0.235  2.116**
Output  0.024  0.345  -0.042  -0.516
Age of Plant  0.108  0.503  0.138  0.626
Development Index  0.669  4.299**  0.671  3.563**
Number of Plants in State  1.153  3.05**  1.027  2.697**
Per Capita State Domestic  0.361  0.718  0.571  1.039
Product
Water Used for Bathing  0.786  2.872**  0.616  1.900*
Water Used for Industrial  -1.146  -2.741**  -1.323  -3.089**
Purposes
Constant  -16.802  -3.185**  -18.224  -3.253**
Number of Observations  75 l  71
Ri  l  0.37 l  0.36
* * significant at 5% confidence levels
*  significant at 10% confidence levels
The inspection equation indicates that inspections are focused on plants whose emissions levels are high,
and whose effluent flows into water bodies which are used for non-industrial purposes.16 Inspections
15  A Hausman  test failed to reject the hypothesis  of exogeneity  for the two  equations.
16  End-use  of the water body receiving  the effluent  was classified  among  bathing,  irrigation,  drinking,  fishing,
industry,  recreation,  and other. The use for  bathing  was highly correlated  with  fishing  (0.62), irrigation  (0.31)
and drinking  (0.53), so we used a dummy  for bathing  in  the analysis.
11also occur  significantly  more frequently  in more developed  districts. They are strongly  positively
associated  with the size of the manufacturing  sector  as measured  by the number  of plants in the state and,
unsurprisingly,  are not related  to plant characteristics  like age and size once total emissions  have  been
controlled  for.
The large positive  and significant  elasticity  of inspections  with respect  to the number  of plants in the
state indicates  that the latter may be a structural  determinant  of funding  for monitoring  and enforcement.
In other  words, funding  for inspectors  and equipment  appears  to be allocated  by state pollution  control
boards in line with the perceived  magnitude  of the regulatory  problem. The strong positive  relationship
between  inspection  rates and district development  is interesting,  although  not entirely surprising. The
economic  efficiency  argument  for targeting  monitoring  resources  to areas where the valuation  of
damages  and willingness-to-pay  to avoid damage  is relatively  high has been mentioned  earlier. In
addition,  it may  well be the case that these areas are perceived  as being  more likely to complain  or make
use of political  or other  channels  to pressure  regulators  to take action against  polluters. If this were a
diversion  of regulatory  resources away from legitimate  problems  it would be a concern  on both ethical
and economic  grounds. However,  from the results on load  and end-use of effluent  it appears  that
inspections  do take place in response  to the correct signals on enviromnental  damage.
In this regard,  the BOD equation is somewhat  surprising  since it indicates  that total BOD emissions  are
unaffected  by inspections.' 7 This raises obvious  questions  about the nature of enforcement,  including  the
level of fines and probability  of punishment,  as well as the possibility  of corrupt  inspectors. At the same
time it supports  the view of Indian  analysts  that abatement  equipment  is only activated  when inspections
are scheduled  to occur.  18
A particularly  intriguing  aspect is why inspections  should  be significantly  higher  in more developed
districts. If this is in response  to expectations  or actual  exertion  of community  pressure,  as has been
posited  above,  then, given  the lack of a plant response  to inspections,  one wonders  about  the rationality
of such  expectations  or such pressure. A somewhat  depressing  alternative  explanation  is that richer
17  The  contemporaneous  nature  of this  dataset  leaves  us with  no way  of assessing  whether  there  is,  in fact,  a
lagged  impact  with  inspections  affecting  BOD  emissions  in  the  next  period.
is  Communication  of Vandana  Bhatnagar,  TERI.
12districts may be where opportunities for rent seeking by state inspectors are highest, resulting in perverse
incentives to inspect (to say the least).
Returning to the estimation results, we note that BOD load is increasing in output, but at a decreasing
rate, so that per unit output larger plants are cleaner than smaller ones.  This is a very robust result and
corroborates evidence from other countries.  Plant age is not a significant variable.19 The export dummy
is negative and close to significance, indicating that foreign influence may not be as big an influence on
clean production or abatement as has been hypothesized in the literature.20 Again this is consistent with
the findings of other research.
Table 5.  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE: LOG BOD LOAD
Independent Variables (in  OLS  2SLS
logs)
Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.
Number of Inspections  0.165  1.368  0.279  1.168
Output  0.366  3.944**  0.368  3.898**
Age of Plant  0.287  1.041  0.264  0.931
Export  dummy  -0.754  -1.600  -0.750  -1.598
Share of Employment  0.546  2.998**  0.523  2.683**
Development Index  0.247  0.638  0.204  0.556
State Rate of Interest  -10.481  -3.854**  -10.476  -3.765**
State Electricity Price  7.940  3.802**  7.487  X  3.1  **
State Manufacturing Wage  -1.647  -2.200**  -1.465  -2.158**
Paper dummy  1.848  2.319**  1.868  2.305**
Textile dummy  -1.277  -1.948*  -1.229  1.793  *
Leather dummy  -0.324  -0.443  -0.228  -0.292
Constant  16.842  1.716*  17.080  1.685*
Number of Observations  71  71  _
___________________________  0.599  0.596
* * significant at 5% confidence levels
*  significant at 10% confidence levels
19  A more  accurate  measure  of age would  be the vintage  of capital. Although  our data did include  a measure  of
the average  age of capital  stock,  too few plants  reported  it for us to be able to use it in our regressions.
However,  it was highly correlated  (0.7) with plant  age, so we may not be too far off in using it.
20  See,  for instance,  Eskeland  and Harrison  (1997).
13The coefficient  on the dummy  for whether  or not a plant is traded on the stock market is not significant,
implying  that market reputation  concerns  have yet to be translated  into stock price effects in India. Since
37% of the plants in our sample  are traded  on Indian bourses,  this points  to the fact that environment
related  information  is not used much by traders  in India. This may also reflect  the fact that
environmental  liabilities  are (correctly)  perceived  to be insignificant. The coefficient  on multi-plant
status  was not significant  in the inspection  equation. We hence  dropped  both the traded dummy  and the
dummy  for multiplant  status from the reported  regressions.
State manufacturijg  wage is significantly  negatively  associated  with BOD emissions  indicating  that
labor  and materials  are complements  in production,  and that this effect outweighs  any effect of lower
wages on abatement  effort. The elasticity  of BOD emissions  with respect  to the statewide  rate of interest
is highly negative,  indicating  complementarity  of capital and materials  in production  in the sectors  being
examined. The strong positive  elasticity  of BOD emissions  with respect  to electricity  price implies  a
relationship  of gross substitution  between  materials  and energy  that would  reinforce  the impact  of energy
prices  on the running of abatement  equipment.
Of the sectoral  dummies  included  in the regression,  paper is highly  significant  and positive, indicating
that this is much dirtier than the other sectors,  while  textiles (which  here includes  spinning  units as well
as dying and finishing  units) is relatively  cleaner.
Coming  to the location  specific  factors  that might be expected  to reflect  informal  pressure  on plants,  we
find that BOD emissions  are not affected  by whether  or not the plant is located  in an area with high
levels of development,  as measured  by the development  index. These  would  be the very communities
we would expect to lobby hard and negotiate  forcefully  for lowered  emissions.
At the same  time, plants that are seen to be big employers  in the district, as measured  by their share of
total district employment,  are significantly  larger  polluters  than others. This supports  the idea that these
plants are subjected  to no (or little)  pressure  from district and local organizations  because  of the huge
leverage  they have  by virtue of their employment  generating  ability. As mentioned  earlier,  this is
consistent  with the findings  of Gray and Deily (1996)  who find that enforcement  effort is less likely  to be
14directed towards plants when the political costs in terms of unemployment are likely to be high.21 Local
employment share was not a significant determinant of the inspections equation, so we infer that in the
BOD equation this variable reflects the level of local pressure alone.
VI.  Conclusions
This paper shows  that high levels of pollution  elicit a formal  regulatory  response  in the form of
inspections  in India. However,  there appears  to be no impact  of inspections  on emissions,  underlining
the institutional failures that Indian academics have been concerned about.22 In the most positive
interpretation, inspections are probably ineffective in bringing about desired changes in behavior because
of bureaucratic or other problems in following through - the probability of enforcement is low and the
penalty for non-compliance  is not stringent enough to act as a deterrent.  On a more pessimistic note,
inspections in an environment of poorly paid inspectors with poor morale may be opportunities for rent
seeking more than anything else.
We cannot come to a strong conclusion about the efficacy of inspections, however suggestive our initial
results, simply because our data do not allow us to look at actual compliance or non-compliance, which
are the relevant results of interest.  In the absence of time series data we are also unable to infer a causal
relationship between inspections and reduced emissions.  An important task for future research would be
to examine the impact of lagged inspections on emissions.
Our results on proxies for informal sources of pressure on industrial plants are ambiguous.  Our work in
other countries has indicated that communities are often able to pressure plants to reduce emissions and
that better educated and higher income communities are better able to do so. However, we find little
evidence in support of this thesis in this analysis of  Indian manufacturing plants.  At the same time we
are bemused by the significantly higher level of inspections observed in more developed districts.
There are at least two possible explanations for why BOD emissions may be independent of  the district
development index.  On the optimistic side, this may be the result of community activism being
21  Pargal  and Wheeler (1996)  find the opposite  result  on emissions  for Indonesian  plants that  are large  employers.
Unlike  this analysis,  they do not control  for formal  regulation  in that paper.
22  Comment  of Professor  Murali  Patibandla,  Indian  Institute  of Management,  Ahmedabad.
15unrelated  to levels of urbanization,  income,  and education  so that dirty plants are targeted, irrespective  of
where  they are located. Less sanguinely,  this may be because  direct community  pressure  on plants is not
a major  determinant  of emissions  reduction  in our sample  of Indian  firms. In support  of the latter  thesis,
we noted  that pressure  from neighbours  and NGOs  were not significant  as predictors  of lowered  BOD
levels in India although  the plants in our survey  identified  them as being important  factors  in inducing
abatement.
We have controlled  for the impact  of formal regulation  on emissions,  as measured  by plant inspections.
Since  there does not appear  to be any residual  variation  in emissions  by location  in our sample,  but there
is a large  variation  in the rate of inspection  by location,  we infer  that the community  pressure  that exists
is probably  channeled  through the formal  mechanism  rather  than through direct negotiation  with plants.
It may well  be that plants in India are less amenable  to meeting  with representatives  of the community  or
that the community  has trouble organizing  itself to negotiate  with plants. Also, our sample  consists  of
large and medium  sized enterprises  which may be less susceptible  to direct pressure  than smaller entities.
All in all this analysis  provides no evidence  of successful  informal  pressure  on plants in India. More
ominously,  the lack of an impact  of inspections  on emissions  points to severe problems  in the working  of
the formal  regulatory  system. Under  these circumstances,  the Indian  public's recourse  to Public  Interest
Litigation  seems perfectly  rational.
Our other  findings  are interesting  because  they support  the plant level regularities  in pollution  control
costs observed  by other analysts. 23 The  evidence  that larger  plants  are relatively  "cleaner"  than smaller
ones is consistent  with findings  in the rest of the world. Indian  policy makers  and regulators  thus need  to
explicitly  recognize  the trade-off in environmental  quality  of the existing  regulatory  bias towards  the
small and medium  scale sector.
23  See,  for instance,  Dasgupta  et al.  (1996).
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17Appendix
Table 1A.  Data  Sources
Variable  Source
Plant  data
BOD load (mg per month)  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey, 1996
Output  (Rs. 1000)  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey,  1996
Total number  of inspections  (1990-94)  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey, 1996
Effluent use  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey, 1996
Age of plant  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey, 1996
Whether  exporter,  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey, 1996
District  data  ':
District  development  index  CMIE: Profile  of Districts
Plant  employment  share in districts  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey, 1996
manufacturing  work  force  and CMIE: Profile  of Districts
State data
Total number  of manufacturing  plants in state  Annual survey  of industries,  1992-93
State domestic  product  per capita (1992-93)  Economic  Survey  of India, 1994-95
State manufacturing  wage (Rs/year)  (1992-93)  Annual survey  of industries,  1992-93
State rate of interest (percent)  PRDEI  Industrial  pollution  survey, 1996
State electricity  price (paisa/kilowatt  hour)  TERI: Energy  Data  and Directory
_Yearbook,  1995-96
18Table  2A.  Summary  Statistics
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Plant data
BOD load (mg per month)  124  I.OOE+09  7.52E+09  80000  8.10E+10
Output (Rs. 1000)  250  4.65E+08  2.27E+09  0  2.25E+10
Total number of inspections  243  27  30.48113  1  132
(1990-94)  _
Water used for bathing  250  0.088  0.283863  0  1
purposes
Water used for industrial  250  0.132  0.33917  0  1
purposes
Age of plant  240  20.19583  20.69138  0  121
Whether exporter  233  0.300429  0.459432  0  1
District data
District development index  250  4.843267  0.649739  3.688879  6.556778




Total number of  250  11197.54  3940.71  3346  15972
manufacturing plants in state
State domestic product per  250  6512.528  1874.3  4280  11650
capita (1992-93)
State manufacturing wage  250  24489.75  5769.686  15832.35  38600.17
(Rs/year) (1992-93)
State rate of interest (percent)  250  18.22964  1.327959  14.7  20.02
State electricity price  250  211.6532  21.85969i  149.5  232.9
(paisa/kilowatt hour)
19Table 3A.  First stage regression  results
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE: LOG BOD  LOAD
Variable (in logs)  Coef.  t stat
Output  0.499  3.58**
Age of Plant  0.425  1.456
Export dummy  -0.550  -1.165
Share of Employment  0.391  1.723*
Development Index  0.451  1.14
State Rate of Interest  -8.196  -1.622
State Electricity Price  8.334  3.638**
State Manufacturing Wage  -1.605  -1.56
Paper dummy  1.672  2.862**
Textile dummy  -1.214  -1.838*
Leather dummy  -0.110  -0.144
Number of Plants in State  0.214  0.398
Per Capita State Domestic Product  -1.156  -0.991
Water Used for Bathing  1.217  1.966*
Water Used for Industrial Purposes  0.160  0.281
Constant  10.849  0.797
Number of Observations  72
0.5111
* * significant at 5% confidence levels
*  significant at 10% confidence levels
20Table 4A.  First stage regression results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  LOG OF INSPECTIONS
Variable (in logs)  Coef.  t stat.
Output  -0.036  -0.559
Age of Plant  0.195  1.52
Export  dummy  0.309  1.406
Share  of Employment  0.290  2.835**
Development  Index  0.454  2.494**
State  Rate of Interest  0.395  0.212
State  Electricity  Price  2.475  2.548**
State  Manufacturing  Wage  -1.907  -3.751  **
Paper dummy  0.457  1.773*
Textile dummy  -0.289  -1.093
Leather  dummy  -0.766  -2.333**
Number of Plants in State  0.734  2.662**
Per Capita State Domestic  Product  1.255  2.686**
Water  Used for Bathing  0.575  1.683*
Water Used for Industrial  Purposes  -0.904  -2.811  **
Constant  -9.862  -1.362
Number of Observations  161
_  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  0.2  8  7
* * significant at 5% confidence levels
*  significant  at 10%  confidence  levels
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